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Abstract
This study seeks to determine whether the process of mortgage finance
liberalization, manifested in concurrent activities of securitization, deregulation, and neoliberal policy, have resulted in changes to the tenure of residents in neighborhoods in
Tampa Bay. It makes use of existing literature on gentrification and mortgage finance
and compares those findings with three sample neighborhoods in and around the city of
Tampa. To do so the thesis employs data collected from lenders pursuant to the Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act, court records of sales and mortgages filed with the Clerk of the
Circuit Court of Hillsborough County, and interviews with stakeholders such as
community leaders, activists, residents and those involved in the lending industry. It was
discovered that the sample neighborhoods largely conform to expectations about the
general pattern of investment of mortgage dollars in core, peripheral, and semiperipheral neighborhoods. Close analysis indicates that the liberalization of the mortgage
process clearly increased the frequency of resident turnover, thus reducing the tenure of
residents in each neighborhood to varying degrees. Neighborhoods where traditional,
deposit oriented, banks and thrifts dominated the lending market saw a lower tendency
for the rapid churning of housing and thus can be expected to possess a lower turnover
in residents, fewer examples of foreclosure, and a greater level of wealth accumulation
for the homeowner.
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Part I: Introduction

The city is man’s most successful attempt to remake the world he lives in more after his
heart’s desire. But, if the city is the world which man created, it is the world in which he
is henceforth condemned to live. Thus, indirectly, and without any clear sense of the
nature of his task, in making the city man has remade himself. – Robert Park

No choice shapes the way in which people experience their environment more
than how and where they decide to live. The concept of home is a basic component of
our self-identity. The words ‘home’ and ‘house’ are often some of the first that a child
learns. The occupation of a safe and secure home is one way in which we measure our
level of safety. The loss of our home can be the most traumatic and potentially
disastrous event that a person can experience and among the hierarchy of crimes some
of the most disruptive and terrifying are those involving our home; burglary, arson and
home invasion. The sale of our home can bring about financial reward and real estate
has become a massive and world spanning industry. Housing is one of the cornerstones
of modern economies while remaining critically important to the creation of social
networks based on place, proximity, and community. It is important both economically
and socially; a cornerstone of our financial wellbeing and social engagement with the
world.
For these reasons, studying those factors affecting why we choose homes is
critical to our understanding of the way in which we create places for ourselves. This
includes how homes are financed and purchased, and also how families lose their home;
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as in the current wave of foreclosures sweeping many regions of this country. Modern
mortgage finance is a complex affair involving financial players from across the globe in
a distributed network of risk and profit that is increasingly blamed for our current
economic woes.
Research Question
Has the liberalization of the mortgage system of funding home loans accelerated
the turnover of homeowners in neighborhoods in Tampa? Assuming that the social
stability of neighborhoods is disrupted by frequent changes to the people living there, is
a liberalized mortgage process a negative influence on these neighborhoods? There is a
substantial body of work examining the role of finance in the rise and fall of
neighborhoods in other cities based largely upon their location in relationship to the
urban core. This core/semi-periphery/periphery context is used to chart to flow of
capital at the Metropolitan Service Area (MSA) level and Census tract level. This study
locates sample neighborhoods in this context and looks at the long term stability as
represented by housing turnover and relates this to the changing financial regimes of
the study period between 1965 and 2010. The same literature identifies a relationship
between tenure and neighborhood stability, with the findings that when families remain
in neighborhoods for long periods the social networks formed create a stability that is an
attractor to capital. At the neighborhood level it would be beneficial to understand what
affect mortgage policies of deregulation and securitization have upon the long term
stability of these neighborhoods in terms of housing tenure or churn. In a hyperactive
credit environment the literature notes there is intense pressure on some neighborhoods
to strip their properties of equity or relocate the original residents in order that they
realize the benefits of quickly rising home values.
2

History of the Neighborhood
Human settlement patterns have traditionally evolved from the need to settle
near crop or trading collection points. This resulted in the rise of communities, first
villages then towns and cities. The theory of ‘bid-rent’ is a method of modeling how
people make choices as to how they decide on where to live. “Rent” in this context
means whatever funds are needed to pay for the dwelling, be it rent to a landlord or a
mortgage payment to a loan servicing company. Residents will bid as much for their
rent as they need to for accommodations that they find acceptable, based upon a
complex arrangement of needs and wants. Development models such as bid-rent
theory are attempts to explain behavior based on the need for people to settle into
communities for economic, social, and protective reasons . With the advent of various
technologies, from refrigerated transportation of crops and meat, highway and other
human transit systems, and near instant communication across great distances, the
need for people to cluster has become more of an issue of simple human desire. Social
needs can supersede economic ones. While people may no longer require housing close
to farm or factory there are still agglomeration points where people tend to cluster for
various reasons. Cities are still critically important sites of massive capital accumulation
and production (Tse, 2011). Indeed, on a metro scale there are obvious examples of
agglomeration points that still exist. Creative fields still are attracted to northern
California, computer programmers to the Pacific Northwest, and musicians to Austin and
Nashville. Hong Kong, New York, and London dominate the international financial
markets. Cities of the industrial age are both the products and the drivers of economic
necessity (Harvey, 1982).
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On a smaller scale the idea of the ‘neighborhood’ does not depend on the
proximity to a particular resource or factory as much as on the desire of its residents to
remake the neighborhood, and in some ways themselves, in the image they seek to
exemplify. People want to live near people and places they like and with whom we wish
to be associated (Lindstrom, 1997). The result of this desire is the establishment of
neighborhoods based on a variety of factors. These include racial identification, social
class, place of origin, and native language (Wyly, 2004, 2010). What is important to
see in this process is a shift in how families choose where to live. Within American
society, the initial basis for neighborhood division was place of origin. As populations
assimilated and the importance of religious and ethnic backgrounds faded, this became
less common. Race is still a powerful factor of course, although there has been much
research done that indicates current racial divisions in home-buying have as much to do
with the supposedly colorblind predatory lending practices as they do with outright
discrimination. Immergluck has noted that;
Since the advent of the mortgage crisis, most of the policy debate
and attention have focused on reducing foreclosures, rescuing financial
institutions, or the broad revival of housing markets. Little to no
attention has been given to such things as the geographic patterns of
lending in the newly and quickly restructured mortgage market
(Immergluck, 2011b).

Georg Simmel noted that, “Where the quantitative increase in importance and
the expense of energy reach their limits, one seizes upon qualitative differentiation in
order somehow to attract the attention of the social circle by playing upon its sensitivity
for differences (Simmel, Featherstone, & Frisby, 1997).” Although Simmel may seem a
dated reference one must consider that he was writing of the city and its effect on the
people who reside there. In a world where nearly all of us are considered ‘urbanites’ his
4

points on the ‘leveling’ of things via the use of money and how it is the qualitative
improvements that add value may be more prescient than we first realized. This change
in housing patterns follows a very predictable pattern of post-industrial behavior.
As quantitative housing factors become uniform and widely available we seek out
qualitative improvements to set ourselves apart from each other. This is not to say
there is not a difference in housing quality in the United States but that by and large all
homes satisfy the basic needs of habitability. All homes have safe construction
materials, connections to utility and entertainment networks, indoor plumbing, heating,
and air conditioning. Roads and highways, electricity and water, police and fire
protection also service all homes. This uniform availability of quantitative features
requires that in order to set themselves apart people focus on qualitative enhancements
to their homes to add value, in their eyes and those of potential buyers. Residents
have, in any western urban area, nearly unlimited choices as to how and where they can
live. These choices are conditional upon the ability to pay for them. These qualitative
improvements can be the size of the home, the McMansions of the 90s are an example,
or luxury enhancements, swimming pools being the most common, but the most
frequent qualitative enhancement to a home invokes that old real estate mantra;
location, location, location.
Since the housing crash of 2008 the funding for many of the riskier and
irresponsible lenders has disappeared. Anecdotal evidence suggests this has more to do
with the uncertainty of the institutional investor than any regulatory resurgence. As
Immergluck notes, there is significant pressure for Washington to assure investors that
it will provide a Federal guarantee for these investment and those floodgates could,
conceivably, reopen (Immergluck, 2011a). These alternative lenders and exotic lending
5

products represent the liberalized mortgage landscape, and the question of this thesis is
designed to assess if their existence resulted in changes to the lending patterns in the
neighborhoods of Tampa in the same way that the literature has identified in other
cities?
The public often misunderstands the concept of mortgage securitization so it is
necessary to provide a brief description of the process, its origin, purpose, and current
function. Although it is true that many of the financial products and structures in use
today are incredibly complex it must be noted that the key component of it all, money
and the forms it can assume, is a knowable and predictable commodity. Some of the
investment structures created out of monthly mortgage payments can, and do, keep
legions of economists employed. However, “what can be understood in a relatively clear
way … are the forms money takes, by which [is meant] the underlying instruments
created to allow people and institutions to crystallize and move money- to borrow,
invest, save, and speculate.(Christophers, 2009)”
Prior to the creation of securities there existed a lively market in property in the
United States. It was common practice to bid on property and to see the rise and fall of
locally speculative property markets. The Depression brought about a slowdown in this
process and presented serious barriers to the trade in property as credit became difficult
for even good borrowers with jobs to obtain. The decline in home ownership also
presented serious social consequences as the neighborhoods of Depression-era
American began to fracture. People became disconnected from their homes and social
networks by the process of eviction and unemployment. The system in place up until
this point had achieved remarkable success in fostering the creation of vibrant networks
of communities. This success represented the efforts of local agents to control land for
6

the prospect of the rent it could produce, ground rent being the source of wealth for
many (Simmel et al., 1997). However, the system was flawed in the sense that land is
an unattractive location for investment. It is illiquid, costly to maintain and sell, and
prevents the extraction of profit until the end of a long period of stagnation, during
which time market forces, changes in local development, or acts of God can destroy the
investment (Weber, 2002).
The Depression exposed the weakness to this system as the lack of available
credit effectively eliminated the value of land by reducing the capital that could be used
to purchase it. The solution to this quandary was to remove many of the physical
attributes of land from the way in which its purchase was funded. Land as a part of the
process of production, through either the rent it produces in residential use or the
productive value of the work done on the property, represents a barrier to the efficient
circulation of capital (Harvey, 1982). Investing capital in property effectively eliminates
it from circulation. Worse, it risks devaluing or destroying the capital should the use
value of the property be degraded (Harvey, 1982). The goal of the capitalist system is
to minimize the time that capital is stagnant and return it to circulation as quickly as
possible, realizing a surplus value and then returning to money form. This desire is
contradictory to the investment of capital in property for a significant period.
The Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) were created and begat a
secondary market to raise capital. The solution created was to eliminate the investment
in property at all. Securities, also referred to as collateralized debt obligations (CDOs),

debt instruments, or bonds, are created from the accumulated debt of many different
properties. Investors buy interest in the debt represented by these securities, relegating
the actual property to the role of collateral. While it still retains its original use value the
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investment in that value is reserved for the mortgagor (the borrower), alone, the global
investor is solely interested in the debt obligation of the security. Borrowers who met
requirements of credit worthiness and income could again obtain credit in this less risky
investment environment. Quantitative aspects of housing that qualified for a mortgage
were standardized, resulting in uniform building practices and materials and further
enhancing the need for qualitative improvements. This process came to full fruition with
the end of the World War II, when millions of qualified borrowers returned home and
sought new housing. An interesting future line of research would be on how post-War
mortgage finance quickly destroyed and created a new landscape of neighborhoods in
the United States.
Below is a quote from Gotham that is particularly useful in explaining the
process. Here he is examining the role of the Federal National Mortgage
Association, known as Fannie Mae, and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation, known as Freddie Mac, as the two GSEs in the creation of the secondary
mortgage market. These two entities originated during the Depression to buy mortgage
debt from individual banks and savings and loan institutions. They then resold that
debt, in the form of secured bonds, to a secondary market of investors. These bonds
are secured by the collateral of the homes backing the loan. There was also the implicit
assumption that these bonds had the full faith and credit of the U.S. government behind
them. To the extent needed for this thesis we will discuss the process further below.
Both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have played a catalytic role in the
growth of global financial markets and networks of housing finance.
Since the 1960s, these two principle GSEs have been the main secondary
market conduits providing funds for conventional mortgage lending in the
United States. The purpose of the secondary mortgage market is to
increase market liquidity and attract capital to finance housing. In the
“primary” mortgage market, borrowers obtain loans from mortgage
8

originators. In the “secondary” mortgage market, GSEs repackage
mortgages as mortgage- backed or debt securities to sell to institutional
investors. Both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac buy home mortgages in
bulk from the lending institutions that “originate” them. In turn, they sell
bonds based on the value of the mortgages, attracting capital from a
variety of investors (Gotham, 2009).
Although it was the practice of the GSEs to sell securities since the 1930s it was
not until the development of Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) and several other
complex financial tools that the local mortgage markets of the United States were able
to exploit liquidity by securitizing and marketing them throughout the world to various
classes of institutional investor. Investment in REITs (Real Estate Investment Trusts)
became a popular tax shelter under the Reagan administration, where money could be
invested without ‘realizing’ it as income, thus avoiding taxation (Weber, 2002). These

Figure 1 Simplified example of how loans are sold and repackaged as securities. (Christophers,
2009. Image used with permission from Sage.)

tools were so successful that within the span of a few years capital investment in the
U.S. mortgage market tripled, greatly expanding the amount of money available to the
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lending market (Gotham, 2009). Real estate loses its ‘distinct and quirky’ status via
being de-territorialized and marketed (Weber, 2002).
Beginning as early as 1977 foreign investment in the US housing market began
rising dramatically. This was due to a series of regulatory reforms that made it easy for
investors outside the US to buy and seek information on all types of US commodities,
including real estate securities (Gotham, 2006). This increased ability to compete
effectively in cross border commodity sales drew the interest of foreign institutional
investors in the US housing sector. These investors had been largely shut out of the
GSE security markets due to a series of factors that private label securities resolved.
Investors were able to select securities or shares of products that were then invested in
securities that were priced according to the perceived risk of the loans contained within
them. Their investment in this security is referred to as a tranche (see Fig 1 above).
Firms such as Moody’s and Standard and Poor assigned rating systems that supposedly
indicated the relative safety of the investment, thus creating the perception of certainty
in the investment. The ratings from these credit ratings agencies were treated as fact
by the institutional investors who often failed to perform their own due diligence when
investing for their clients. It became apparent after the crisis of 2008 that these ratings
were of limited use.
Ratings agencies were in a difficult position with regards to the new securities
that the institutional investor may have only been partially aware or, regardless of the
fact that these investors, who were ostensibly financial professionals themselves, should
have been savvy enough to recognize that ratings. Regardless, institutional investors
failed to question the quality of the investments they were making. The ‘institutional
investor’ is a collective term for a large cross section of high volume investors. National
10

banks, pension funds, hedge funds, high value persons, and other large organizations
fall into this category. The institutional investor is expected to be a financial
professional themselves, hired to advise high profile clients on investment strategies
with a fiduciary responsibility to perform due diligence when making decisions for their
clients. However, it became apparent that they often simply accepted the ratings issued
by ratings agencies. They did so without questioning the habit of ratings analysts to
quickly develop relationships with the investment banks issuing the securities they were
entrusted to research. Many ratings analysts went on to more profitable careers with
the same investment banks they previously were expected to critique, without raising
the concern of any measurable number of the supposedly “savvy” institutional investor.
Additionally these large investors failed to heed warnings issued by the agencies
themselves that the new securities had no historical basis with which to perform robust
quantitative analyses (Immergluck, 2009a).
Real estate backed securities were perceived as a safe and profitable investment
during a period of substantial financial instability. A series of unrelated actions during
the late 1990s and early 2000s converged in a ‘perfect storm’ scenario that would have
proved difficult if not impossible to stop had there been the political will to do so
(Immergluck, 2009a). State actions to limit the risky loans created by a hungry capital
market were blocked by overriding federal neoliberal activity that sought to create an
environment to attract capital that was seeking large, liquid trading markets.
Securitization was a key element of this process as it connected real-estate markets to
capital markets and created enormous amounts of liquidity in the system (Weber, 2002).
A series of federal government actions over the next 20 years reinforced this perception
and spurred further investment. Private firms were allowed to create and sell their own
11

securities, forcing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to compete with private banks which
were seeking out the most profitable, and consequently risky, loans; loans that the GSEs
would not touch. To this end, they often sought out underserved market segments and
spatial regions to pillage. The GSEs had little incentive to compete directly with these
private firms as another State action removed the restriction forbidding direct
investment in these new private investment banks as if they were any other institutional
investor. The effect was more successful than anticipated and the US housing sector
was awash in global dollars. A ‘Niagara of Capital’ that was celebrated by the Urban
Land Institute, a development think tank, as late as 2008 (Immergluck, 2009b).
Demand creation, rising prices, and increasingly predatory lending practices became
commonplace. This financial environment provides the context for our investigation on
the effects of financial liquidity on the Seminole Heights, Cross Creek, and Carrollwood
neighborhoods in Tampa. It also provides a pattern which may be generalized to other
larger metropolitan regions in which similar market conditions existed.
Although there have been substantial efforts to understand the ways in which
the metastasizing foreclosure crises and mortgage financing have reshaped our
neighborhoods, most of the literature focuses on the regional or metro scale. There is
little literature currently on the effect of mortgage finance upon the neighborhoods that
are the building blocks of urban areas with the exception of some studies such as that of
Strom and Reader, which focused upon the foreclosure issue (Strom & Reader, 2010).
It is clear that effects on neighborhoods extend beyond that of foreclosure, from
rampant unemployment and crime to declining public services and education, the issue
of mortgage finance reaches far beyond the realm of strictly ‘housing’ (Florida, Gabe, &
Mellander, 2011). Finance does not just ‘hang about the rest of the political economy’.
12

It has real consequences to local political structures and sets the rules by which money
is invested or withdrawn from the local market (Weber, 2002).
Why Neighborhoods Matter
Neighborhoods are the places where the majority of us engage with our city.
The word itself implies a bond, rooted in the Germanic term nhgbar, which refers to the
relationship between people with common goals and traits (Kappeler & Bigger, 2011).
Although, in a broad sense, a person will identify themselves as the residents of a city,
when you ask them where they live and work they will normally respond with the name
of a neighborhood. When a person expresses a desire to move to a city, or recalls it
fondly, they are often picturing a particular area in which they enjoyed spending time.
The neighborhood you live in communicates much about you as a person to others
(Lindstrom, 1997). Are you wealthy or poor? Do you have a family or are you single?
Do you value proximity to cultural amenities or wilderness? These traits are
communicated through the neighborhood choices we make. Neighborhoods also
provide a social world unto themselves that is a critical point of interaction for their
residents. Residents of the same neighborhood will eat at many of the same
restaurants, shop at the same markets, and encounter each other on a regular basis.
Their children attend the same schools and play in the same little league. These bonds
are more real and immediate than those between people who live in the same city. For
these reasons, the forces that have a hand in shaping how neighborhoods are created
or remade are critically important.
The Deluge
The cash deluge that the U.S. housing market enjoyed for the better part of the
past 20 years had the effect of heightening class distinctions within residential
13

neighborhoods. Housing developments and community development districts1 created a
new exclusivity that identified residents as a higher class based upon their ability to pay
and special parking decals on their cars. This resulted in increased class conflict in
urban areas as neighborhoods moved from units of cultural and architectural distinction
to fortified realms, with walls, gates, and armed guards (Harvey, 2003). Harvey notes
that, in the Marxist sense, housing, the built environment is a physical manifestation of
the accumulation of surplus capital. However, in the current scheme the built
environment is nothing more than the physical collateral for mortgage loans. The debt
encumbered by those properties being the real ‘place’ of investment, divesting money
completely from investment in land. Prior to the housing crash few voices could be
heard arguing that this ‘Niagara of Capital’ was in fact destructive and the prices homes
were trading for were unsustainable and highly illusory (Immergluck, 2009b). At the
height of the pre-crash frenzy there existed no firm upper limit on the amount of money
a buyer could bid for a home. The only limit that posed any problem was that of
valuation. Could the buyer, or typically their agent, locate an appraiser willing to value
the home at the price that had already been agreed upon? With any number of
financing options available there existed no true limit on the amount of cash that could
change hands (Sikorske, 2011).
As with any market based product there is a disconnect between the producers
of mortgages and the consumers. This gap is bridged by ‘loan originators’, a general
term for a loose affiliation of loan officers, mortgage brokers, and housing finance
companies that seek to create demand for the supply of readily available mortgage

1

This is a term that refers to any process by which legislative authority is granted to an entity to
issue bonds that can be used to fund improvements or amenities to a specific spatially defined
area. These bonds are repaid via tax assessments on property within this spatial area.
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products. In simple terms the American mortgage market suffered from a familiar
pattern to those that study the flaws of industrialization. Mortgage lending had always
been a very personal relationship between the borrower and the lender. Theirs was a
relationship that would last for years or even decades. They had a mutual interest in
each other’s well-being (Immergluck, 2011a). With time this was gradually transformed
into an automated and impersonal industry. Regulatory changes were made which
allowed the process of industrialization to realize its full potential, resulting in a
predictable and unstable overproduction. The market responded in the way it always
does; demand creation, increased efficiency, the opening of new spaces, creative
destruction, and a reset in values.
The Five Stages of Industrial Loan Production
Demand creation in the case of mortgages refers to the explosion of nontraditional lenders during the late 80s through mid-2000s. Deposit institutions that had
traditionally dominated the home loan markets, selling conforming mortgages to the
GSEs and keeping a large portion of the best loans for themselves. Referred to by some
literature as the golden age of lending these lenders were confronted with a problem as
early as the late 1970s (Immergluck, 2011a). They had saturated their native markets
with as many mortgages as they could originate. They had overseen a 40-year period
of gradual and stable rising home prices and their cautious practices had reinforced and
expanded the traditional American neighborhood. This included stable prices and strong
intra-neighborhood social networks as well as brutal racial and ethnic segregation
(Immergluck, 2009c). In the face of increasing pressure to reverse decades of immoral
and racist lending practices and pressure from investors to sell more loans the market
responded by dismantling barriers to whom and how home loans could be made. New,
15

non-traditional lenders began seeking out latent demand that they could exploit.
Through marketing efforts to underserved segments of the population and by creating
new, exotic mortgage products new demand was created very quickly. Critical to this
process was the creation of private label mortgage backed securities. These products
circumvented the need to produce ‘conforming’ loan products that the GSEs would buy
since the non-GSE securities could be resold on the secondary market under the newly
lenient lending regulations. Like the department store that offers generous credit to
their poorest customer the mortgage industry turned a generation of renters with bad
credit and no savings into homeowners in just 20 years by filling endless, sprawling
subdivisions that arose from cow pastures, former farmlands, and abandoned industrial
sites. Residents did not create these neighborhoods as the spatial fix for existing social
structures. These master planned neighborhoods were created as products that could
be sold to specific market segments. Conformity and stability of value were key
elements in their design since their primary purpose was to provide uniform and reliable
collateral. Their location and styles were based upon their appeal to the selfperceptions of prospective buyers.
This deluge of capital unleashed upon the American housing market in the form
of overproduced loans required more demand. New spaces had to be discovered to
create profit. Stable neighborhoods with long histories of home ownership were often
populated with people that owned their homes without a mortgage. The industry
referred to these as ‘unencumbered’ properties. Many had seen their values increase
dramatically with the rise in the availability of home loans. In the over-supplied
environment, these unencumbered properties represent substantial value and a form of
latent profit. Cash out refinances and home improvement loans were used to hollow out
16

this new space and create profit based upon the equity created by the initial wave of
new loan originations. Owners were enticed by skyrocketing prices to sell their homes
and upgrade to newer, and often mortgaged, properties elsewhere. Socially robust
neighborhoods were rendered unstable under the onslaught of overproduced mortgage
products and the intense marketing of these loans.
Finally, we arrived at the final phase of industrial production. The creative
destruction of space to recreate a blank slate in which capitalism can again seek to
create new profit is the foreseeable result to the industrialization and overproduction of
lending products. Weber notes the ultimate problem with property is that is ties up
capital in situ until it returns a profit, and can be an expensive commodity to maintain in
the meantime. This results in a brutal math where spatial-temporal boundaries are used
to preserve value as long as possible but ultimately the “potent spatial fix” of demolition
is used to prepare the land for a new structure when the potential rent exceeds the cost
of abandonment (Weber, 2002).
Foreclosures, mortgage write-downs, where banks are forced to acknowledge
that the collateral is worth less than the debt, and the inability of all but the best
borrowers to obtain a mortgage is the predictable and painful final act in the cycle of
industrialization. Neighborhoods laid waste by the fleeing capital as their residents find
themselves unable to pay the exorbitant sums they were loaned. Even now in suburban
America, squatters exist in their own homes waiting out their foreclosures as best as
they can. Neighborhood services, parks, and schools are starved for funds as property
taxes go unpaid and market values return to pre-boom levels.
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This period is required to set the stage where capitalism can reinvent itself yet
again. If we accept that capitalism is, by design, unstable and volatile then the periods
of destruction are just as important as the periods of stability. The stage is being set for
a recreation of the pre-crash housing market. Although scholars have pushed for a full
exit of the federal government from the housing market (Immergluck, 2011a) it has
become obvious that investors have lost their faith in mortgage backed securities
without federal bailout guarantees. With the stated goal of both parties to wind down
the GSEs and cede the secondary market fully to private label securities there is the
often unstated assumption that the marketability of these private label securities is
going to be predicated upon the explicit guarantee that, when the next crash occurs, the
Federal government will again step in to protect the institutional investors (Immergluck,
2011a). Although this is sold on the pretext of extending the option of the ‘American
Dream’ of ownership to the largest number of people the benefits to those people in
view of the current period of destruction is highly suspect (Shlay, 2006). What seems
more likely is that the ultimate beneficiaries of this explosion in ownership is the
institutional investor, mortgage servicer, and investment bank that reaps profit from the
debt. The homes the public strives to possess being nothing more than a fixed asset, a
form of collateral they can live in, a spatial fix created by capital flows that may have
been formerly invested in British steel plants or American auto factories now find a
home in securities comprised of the debt of millions of homeowners. The spatial aspect
of these events is undeniable, as neighborhoods deal with the fallout of capital fleeing
the housing market, leaving homes vacant, stranding people in their houses, and forcing
communities to deal with a crumbling infrastructure and falling tax revenues at the same
time.
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Part II: Research Literature Review
Conceptually it is important that the purpose for mortgage securitization be laid
bare for critical examination. To this end, we can turn to Harvey and his brilliant
depiction of the circulation process of capital and the ways in which money capital is
thrown into the process of production seeking profit. He notes that landed property
represents a barrier to this production. The landlord who owns the property can exact
rent from its use that hampers the profitability of capital investment (Harvey, 1982).
This is quite the case and we will examine how securitization attacks this problem in two
ways. First, we will examine the diagram that Harvey himself uses to map the
circulation of capital in its many forms throughout the process of production.
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Figure 2 The secondary circuit of capital. (Harvey, 1982. Image used with permission from
Verso.)

Figure 2 illuminates some of the issues inherent in seeking profit through the
investment in land. The circuit of money capital is representative of the cash available
for loan by the mortgage originator. The goal of the capitalist is to shorten the loop that
money capital spends seeking profit before it is returned to them. The creation of
securities achieves this, albeit at a cost. The capitalist must be willing to discount the
loan, that is provide an incentive in the form of giving up part of the long term profit to
be expected from the debt in exchange for the quick turnover. This leads to the
question of why a loan originator2 might want to do this. Later, when we review the
work of Gotham he will address this more clearly but for the time being the answer is
that it minimizes the risk inherent in long term lending of money to individuals. For the
capitalist to realize significant profit they are required to invest a sum of money into the
2

This term can refer to the individual that arranges for a home loan for a client or a company
that seeks customers for the purposes of selling them mortgages on new or existing properties.
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purchase of land, then become a landlord for a period of years. Mortgages would
dissolve some of this barrier, but it was not until the rise of securities in their modern
form that we see the most efficient model, from the capitalist viewpoint. The role of
landlord is handed off from the originating lender within days or weeks of the loan
closing. This allows them to recover their capital in the form of money almost instantly
when compared to the long investment required of the property owner. Next, the debt
of these individual properties is ‘packaged’ or grouped together with other similar debts
and resold on what Harvey refers to as a ‘secondary circuit’. The circuit is secondary in
the sense that it is fully divorced from the primary circuit of capital pictured above, the
circuit within which labor is applied to commodities to create profit. In this way,
securitization provided a solution to the problem posed by landed property.
Discrimination
Williams et al. looks at the concept of inequality in the mortgage lending market
(Williams, Nesiba, & McConnell, 2005). These authors attempt to analyze quantitatively
if new lending practices eliminate discrimination or if a ‘new inequality’ has arisen in its
place. Their primary focus is on the deregulatory period of the 1990’s in the United
States and the creation of a new class of lenders as well as the diversification of
traditional lending practices. This research determined that during the target years
there was a dramatic increase in the number of subprime loans. There was also an
increase in the number and type of lenders willing to make such loans. Williams et al.
also tracked denial rates of these lenders and saw increases in the number of borrowers
seemingly refused a loan. They note that this may have been due to the rise of
mortgage brokering where originators of loans would submit applications multiple times
for the same borrower to various lenders, increasing the chance that they would see a
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denial on a client that was eventually given a loan. In their conclusions, the authors
assert that minorities continue to be victims of a new inequality in the mortgage market.
Minorities represent a new market for home loans, one that has been ignored by
traditional lenders. Taking advantage of a highly deregulated marketplace, these new
lenders are more willing to extend credit to minorities by engaging those communities in
ways that traditional lenders are unwilling to do. This increases the possibility of a
minority borrower selecting these lenders. In return, the lenders charge higher fees and
rates than a traditional lender might, increasing the possibility that the borrower might
eventually default on the loan. Williams et. al. conclude that this results in an
environment where “old inequalities have slowly diminished, new inequalities have risen
in their place.”
In her work on the subject of high cost mortgages and their effects on the
homebuying by minority borrowers, Been lays out clearly the process by which black and
Hispanic homebuyers are often targeted for loans that have a substantially higher cost
and higher incidence of default. She notes that underlying income disparities and a lack
of experience with financial products provide, “increased opportunities for high-cost
lenders and mortgage brokers to target potential borrowers (Been, 2009).” Been also
finds that segregation further limits the access of minorities to sources of financing that
other market segments are offered. Multiple sources of funding are important if
borrowers want to discover lending products that are suited to their needs. Although
her study does not establish causality, it clearly demonstrates that social and spatial
segregation exacerbates this effect on minorities and makes them more likely to be the
victim of high cost loans which, by proxy, reduce their bid-rent ability as well as increase
their chances for default.
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Gentrification
Lees explores the concept of gentrification and notes that modern mortgage
finance options enhance the specter of gentrification as a permanent replacement of
existing residents of an area with a wealthier class of homeowner. She notes that the
pressure to redirect capital flow to select urban neighborhoods has resulted in the
pressure on public policy to use public money to remake the urban landscape to be
friendlier to mortgage investment (Lees, 2000). To this end, brownfield sites are
cleaned up and other urban amenities are added to enhance the ability of the area to
attract capital in the form of mortgages that are most often available to a wealthier class
of homeowner. She contends that the corrections of generations of neglect are done,
not at the behest of the residents of these urban neighborhoods, but at the behest of
forces of capital seeking out new spaces for profitability. The current residents of these
areas, her examples include Park Slope and Prospect Heights, Brooklyn and Hackney,
London, sell out to initial gentrifiers. These are typically urban pioneers, lured by the
‘newness’ of the area and the room for adding surplus value to their new investment
through improvements to the property and neighborhood.
In cities with sufficient capital flow a class of ‘financified’ gentrifiers, she refers to
them as super-gentrifiers, who care little for working to add surplus value to their new
acquisition can replace these pioneers later. They are seeking a new residence in the
city as a weekday residence close to the office, as a new start for working emptynesters, or as an urban retirement spot. Lees pursues two models of gentrification and
explores how the existing gentrification literature divides into competing views of the

emancipatory and revanchist cities. In her emancipatory city, the urban pioneers seek

23

out a new landscape in the city whereby classes and races mingle and enjoy the urban
space and cosmopolitanism of the city with one another. The revanchist city is a much
more sinister and pessimistic viewpoint, where class warfare brutally suppresses desire
and social heterogeneity. Clear cut lines are established around certain neighborhoods
favored by financial interests that seek zones of the city where the greatest profit can be
realized (Smith, 2002). She explains this dualism by noting the work of Butler who
writes that the perception of a place in the minds of people can determine if the process
of gentrification is one determined solely by the ‘logic of capital’ or if there is a
concerted effort to create a sense of place that includes existing cultural and human
elements.
Lees work predates the most meteoric period of the mortgage crises. She fails
to anticipate that the process of mortgage loan origination would result in lending on a
scale never before seen in the U.S. housing market. This process may invalidate some
of her findings, as residents of gentrifying neighborhoods would have likely been able to
remain in those neighborhoods, borrowing against the newfound equity in their
properties with a variety of new financial products marketed heavily towards them. Of
course, many of these products were predatory in nature, and targeted low income or
minority borrowers with high cost loans designed to extract the most profit for the
lender in the short term. Refinancing debt often resulted in the stripping of equity, via
the fees associated with the refinance itself or the likely result that the homeowner
would take some of the equity in the form of cash at the closing table.
Freeman notes the importance of the residents of gentrifying neighborhoods
possessing the purchasing power that sub-prime lending made possible (Freeman,
2002). Without the ability to borrow beyond the limits imposed by conforming loan
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products offered by traditional lending channels these homeowners were often
supplanted by the urban pioneers. Rent occupies a larger proportion of the monthly
income of poor residents than of non-poor residents, resulting in a reduction in the
health of the poor homeowner as they allocate limited resources towards the rent. The
ultimate result of this environment is a breach of the implied social contract between
society and all of its members to provide for adequate housing and health of all people
regardless of economic status. While sub-prime lending can provide a temporary bridge
allowing this contract to be upheld, the evidence in the literature on sub-prime lending is
that it became highly predatory and abusive over time. In practice, it targeted the very
homeowners that it was intended to assist, allowing them to remain in place and
ultimately it contributed to increasing prices that forced the exclusion of the poor from
the most desirable neighborhoods.
Mortgage Finance
Immergluck analyzes the roles of GSE lenders and the FHA in his work on the
ways in which the landscape of mortgage finance affects the distribution of homebuyers.
He notes that as the 2008 real estate crash occurred the FHA filled a vital role as the
lender of last resort for a large percentage of home purchases. In areas that were the
hardest hit by falling home values FHA loans accounted for over 70% of closed loans
(Immergluck, 2011b). By the end of 2008, the national average was 40% of single
family home loans were FHA loans; a level he notes was unseen since the Second World
War. In this context, he notes that since 2008 very little attention has been paid to
geographic lending patterns in the quickly restructured post crash mortgage market. He
warns that this may lead to any number of abuses such as redlining, steering, and other
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discriminatory practices that were standard practice for much of the 20th century
(Immergluck, 2011b).
Immergluck also looks at the current proposals to ‘wind down’ the GSEs Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac. He enumerates three broad options available to forces that seek
to remake the investment landscape in the United States (and, by proxy, globally).
These include options to fully privatize mortgage markets, removing the role of the
federal government in purchasing any loans at all and leaving the entire market as a
profit-making space for private firms. Also included are options to privatize the industry
with a ‘limited’ guarantee from the federal government to bailout firms again should yet
another meltdown occur. Finally, the last option is a heavily regulated secondary market
where a system of private bond issuers would operate in a heavily regulated
environment with a government backstop. He notes that although this option affords
the greatest protection and stability for the public it is vulnerable to weakening via
legislative action over time, much as the existing system was weakened via the creation
of private bond issuers in the first place. He offers another solution, a private bond
market where the federal government is specifically prohibited from offering any
backstop at all. He argues this would force bond issuers to practice self-restraint in
judging risk.
Gotham interprets the rise of the mortgage securitization market within the
context of Marx’s secondary circuit of capital (Gotham, 2006). Gotham notes the
peculiar ability of securitization to render the fixed asset of land into a liquid financial
instrument in the form of a debt instrument such as a security. This is important, he
asserts, because although the academic work on globalization suggests decreased
power of the national governments, the conversion of real estate from a fixed, illiquid
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asset that has a value determined by local factors of production into a liquid object for
capital investment is facilitated by the state. Real estate achieves liquidity and then
undergoes a process of ‘de-territorialization’ whereby the state assumes a less important
role in how value and price of land is determined. Gotham looks at the mechanisms of
liquidity that render the U.S. real estate market de-territorialized. First, he reviews the
role of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. These GSEs played a key role in developing a
global investor base that channel cash into the U.S. real estate system. Next, he pays
particular attention to the development of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) by the
GSEs and the role they played in accelerating the pace of global investment into
mortgages in the U.S. Then he examines the role of state policy in allowing these
changes and how that has allowed the real estate market to move beyond state control
now that it is almost fully liquid. His figures show a rapid rise in global investment in
real estate beginning in the early 80s, and across the board jumps in capital flows into
MBSs and REITs (Real Estate Investment Trusts) in the early 90s to a plateau by the
early 2000s. It is notable that Gotham’s work predated the collapse of the housing
market. An updated look at global investment in American real estate post collapse
would be needed to determine if global capital flows had identified a more secure source
of surplus value than the U.S. market.
Gotham concludes that the reconfiguration of the housing market to allow for
greater liquidity is a state controlled function and that, far from indicating a retreat of
the state, it indicates a proactive approach whereby the state assumes the role of
enabler for the flow of global funds into local housing markets. Gotham notes that the
level of liquidity is not uniform; it varies across America based upon class and regional
differences. He also notes examples of the volatility and instability that these changes
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had wrought outside the United States. This instability can have the effect of ‘drying up’
mortgage lending in some areas and exacerbating regional differences rather than
homogenizing them. Prophetically he warns that, “In the future, these consequences
probably will be felt most strongly by the least-protected classes of people and places,
for whom funds are typically only marginally available (Gotham, 2009).”
In an updated article Gotham examines in particular the ways in which mortgage
backed securities affected the subprime housing market that led to the greatest
instability in the U.S. market (Gotham, 2009). He notes that the unique attribute of
securitization is the conversion of a spatial fix into a liquid resource and that this is an
inherently irrational way of conceiving the built environment. In particular, the result of
rampant liquidity in the quest to constantly increase the velocity of capital through the
mortgage system resulted in the expansion in investment in the subprime housing
market. These loans were inherently class based in that they were demonstrably
targeted at lower income brackets without the education to fully understand the
implication of the agreements they were entering into. Other researchers have
repeatedly shown that there is a significant race and class element involved in these
loans and that the instability that Gotham notes is a feature of the liquefaction process
is felt especially hard on these demographic sectors (Been, 2009; Williams et al., 2005;
Wyly, Atia, Foxcroft, Hammel, & Phillips-Watts, 2006).
Wyly returns the study of mortgage finance patterns to its roots in the
scholarship of Harvey, “although we rely on some of the standard methods of the
mainstream housing policy literature, the theoretical foundations of our work come from
Harvey’s (1974) framework connecting local housing submarket inequalities to the
dynamics of national capital accumulation (Wyly, 2011).” This paper was titled “Capital
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is the Landlord” based upon the observation by one of his students that the rise of
securitization created a new class of renter with a mortgage and for whom ‘ownership’,
in the sense of owning property unencumbered by mortgage, did not exist. Wyly’s work
focuses on the spatial aspects of mortgage lending patterns in the United States. He
notes that large banks and local funding sources dominated the golden age of mortgage
lending spanning the period from the creation of the GSEs through the 1960s. Their
activities were predicated on and perpetuated racial and class discrimination that were
the subject of several reform efforts in the latter part of this period. These efforts would
lead to extensive legislation and regulation. The unintended consequence of this was
the automation of underwriting standards to remove bias from the system, however this
severed the relationship between lender and borrower as thoroughly as the market does
the producer and consumer of any product. Simultaneously, lenders were pressuring for
the ability to shed the risk inherent in such loans, the pass-through system of packaging
and selling the loans accelerated the push to full loan automation. This resulted, Wyly
argues, in new versions of housing classes shaped by “intricate rules of mortgage debt.”
(Wyly, 2011)
In a seminal work, “Islands of Decay in Seas of Renewal”, Wyly explores how the
urban landscape of America has been altered in part due to changes in how mortgage
loans are funded (Wyly & Hammel, 1999). Written near the end of the heady ‘90s, this
paper notes that at the time of its writing the US housing market was in “its eighth full
year” of economic expansion. He notes that desolate inner city regions that were
formerly ignored by traditional bankers who eschewed the risk of the city for the relative
security of the suburbs were undermined by a series of legal, economic, and social
changes. Legal challenges to the role of concentrated urban public housing in
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continuing class subjugation opened the suburbs to public housing recipients of such
programs as Section 8. At the same time, publically funded or led initiatives to attract
investment to blighted downtown core areas resulted in variously titles areas of
investment that he refers to as ‘e-zones’. Wyly identifies three general policy initiatives
that were important to the process of fostering urban reinvestment. These were a trend
to disperse poor population into the suburbs and destroy the massive public housing
structures known as ‘the projects’. Subsidizing efforts to develop entertainment, retail,
or housing projects in the urban core vacated by the public housing, and promoting
greater mobility options between the urban and suburban areas allowing easy
commutes in both directions. He concludes that a resurgence of mortgage lending
occurs in these newly gentrified urban cores.
In his later works, Wyly notes that in these newly gentrified or gentrifying areas
attracted what was later determined to be non-portfolio lending. Brokers or lenders that
did not intend to hold the loans in their portfolio but intended to sell off the debt, to
Fannie Mae or through a private investment bank, typically made these loans. This
often resulted in looser borrower requirements (Wyly et al., 2006) and higher debt-toincome ratios (Wyly, 2010). These lenders often made a practice of pushing subprime
or alt-a loans to these areas, regardless of the characteristics of the borrower.
On closer inspection, the lending patterns of undesirable subprime loans have a
clear class/racial bias. Wyly notes that he finds uncontestable proof that lenders
participate in “persistent racial targeting.” Think of it as a new version of the ‘black tax’,
where even borrowers with good credit histories are targeted for higher cost loans (Wyly
et al., 2006). Prior to mass securitization a sense of shared interest of all parties,
mortgagee (the lender), mortgagor (borrowers), and originator (mortgage broker or
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loan officer), bound them together. Securitization allowed this partnership to end; the
originator and original mortgagee realize their profit almost immediately and then are
free to return their money capital, plus their profit, to originate new loans. Wyly notes
that in this context the mortgagor is left with reduced buying power in a market where
rampant mortgage loans drive prices upward. This process increased the chances of
default on the part of the mortgagor. Although in the case of default, the original lender
is often required to buy back the loan they are insured against such an eventuality and
such insurance costs are already incorporated into the price of the loan. The effect on
the mortgagor is more pronounced as they suffer the reduced neighborhood choice
reminiscent of historic ‘redlining’ processes as well as the increased chance for the
socially disruptive process of default and foreclosure. These processes effectively retard
the ability of these groups to accumulate capital efficiently.
Finally, Wyly notes that the process of securitization severed the traditional
mutual interests of all parties in avoiding individual cases of default (Wyly, 2011). He
contends that the explosion in lower class and minority homeownership in fact simply
glossed over the fact that this new wave of home ownership was in fact a new form of
renting. Complex financial products, prepayment penalties, and intense marketing
pressure sought to ensure that few homeowners would ever pay off their housing debt.
First, we propose that subprime and predatory lending, fueled by changes in the
institutional structure of housing finance and the expansion of the secondary
market, has been targeted at those working class and minority neighborhoods
that have traditionally suffered from discrimination, redlining, and disinvestment.
Second, we hypothesize that “choice,” at least as measured in terms of demand
side characteristics of borrowers, in an inadequate, limited way of understanding
the rise of subprime and predatory lending; instead, we propose that the new
geography of class monopoly rent is best understood in terms of the strategies
and characteristics of lenders. New Types of lenders, and new subsidiaries of
established lenders, are actively targeting particular groups of homeowners and
homebuyers. Third, we hypothesize that subprime and predatory capital has a
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clear spatiality that cannot be understood solely in terms of the economic
dimensions of supply and demand. Housing and credit market segmentation
help to sustain localized frameworks conductive for accumulation. We suggest
that the institutional transformation of the last thirty years has not entirely
erased the patterns of segmentation documented by Harvey’s work in the early
1970s; but we also contend that it is possible to trace some of the new
connections between local predatory practices and national and transnational
global markets. (Wyly, 2011)
Using these proposals, this thesis attempts to discern if similar patterns discovered by
Wyly at the metro level exist in local neighborhoods in Tampa. If so, are these patterns
evidence that the answer to the research question, if the liberalized mortgage process of
deregulation and securitization has altered the social and spatial structures of
neighborhoods in Tampa, can be answered affirmatively.
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Part III: Sample Neighborhoods and an Analysis of Case Study Data
This thesis focuses primarily on the spatial distribution of mortgages in three
sample neighborhoods in Hillsborough County, Florida. They are all included in the
metro region of Tampa, although not necessarily within the city limits. Using data
gathered from publically available court records including deeds, mortgages, liens, lis
pendens filings3 as well as interviews with stakeholders4, spatial analysis of development
patterns and historical records of the neighborhoods this study will examine lending
patterns for the three areas. The study will then determine how the increased liquidity
of liberalization may have affected these neighborhoods as they made the transition
from a period of traditional lenders offering portfolio based and GSE conforming
mortgages to a period of non-traditional and sub-prime lenders. These non-traditional
sources of mortgage funding demanded the creation of new spaces of profit in areas
previously ignored by mainstream lending organizations. This means that spaces once
closed to home lending, the subprime market as well as depopulated industrial sites or
ravaged inner-city neighborhoods, were opened up to capital flows in ways that did not
previously exist (S.C, 2012; Williams et al., 2005; Wyly, 2011; Wyly et al., 2006). These
non-traditional sources specialized in targeting specific borrowers in areas ignored by
traditional funding sources. This should be displayed in the sample communities as a
predictable pattern of lending and foreclosure (Immergluck, 2009b, 2009c).
3

Lis Pendens documents are filed to indicate that a lender is pursuing foreclosure action against
a homeowner and typically indicates that the borrower is at least 60 days past due on mortgage
payments.
4
Stakeholders are defined in this context as an person with a vested personal or professional
interest in the sample neighborhood: Community residents, leaders, gardeners, and lending
professionals were approached for their perspective.
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Figure 3 Location of the three sample communities. (Florida Geographic Data Library)

This study will build upon the work of Wyly in Baltimore, New York, and
Washington DC where he examined the lending patterns of both prime and sub-prime
lenders across metro regions and determined clear patterns of discrimination and
predatory lending. This thesis will make use of publicly available data as well as case
studies and interviews to see if the results of Wyly in large, urban centers also exist in
Tampa’s urban, suburban, and exurban neighborhoods. This will make use of
observations, histories, and public records to construct a narrative of the three sample
neighborhoods before and after the advent of modern mortgage securitization.
Furthermore, the study will also examine sample properties from each category to
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determine if the results of Wyly’s work are replicated at a smaller scale than is present
in the literature.
Methodology
Ideally, a study of neighborhood level lending patterns from 1965-2010 would
make use of a database that could identify such patterns of “micro-level” data.
Unfortunately, such data is simply not available prior to 1990 (Wyly & Hammel, 1999).
Most of the studies in the gentrification literature make use of census level demographic
figures and identify a few specific variables that can be used to map out gentrified
neighborhoods. This runs the risk of what Wyly refers to as ‘implied empiricism”. The
methods of this thesis attempt to blend statistical evidence with field observations to
eliminate the errors commonly associated with such methods, notably the impression of
gentrification in areas that never experienced any class turnover or outmigration of
capital (Wyly & Hammel, 1999). While this thesis uses Home Mortgage Disclosure Act
(HMDA) data which is available from 1999-2010 it also uses case studies derived from
county records that cover the entire study period from 1965 to 2010. By doing so the
ability to see turnover in the homeownership of specific neighborhoods is greatly
enhanced.
The County maintains official documents such as deeds, mortgages, and lis
pendens filings as PDF files available to the public via the county website. This period is
convenient because it encompasses the entire span of the neo-liberal revolution that
allowed massive in-flows of capital into the mortgage system via tools such as
securitization and the deregulation of housing finance. These documents are used to
create case studies of individual properties that can be used to examine the larger
neighborhood to see if patterns of investment identified by the literature are seen at the
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level of individual properties in Tampa Bay. This process circumvents the limitation
inherent to other studies which limit their investigations to post-1990 data (Immergluck,
2009c, 2011b; Wyly, 2011; Wyly & Hammel, 1999). Instead, this thesis uses case
studies of individual properties gathered from the careful review of court filed
documents to determine the long term progression of lending activity, including sales
dates and amounts, refinances, and foreclosure activity, on a selection of properties
from each neighborhood. These factors are all identified in the literature as being key
indicators of turnover, or churn, in resident tenure (Been, 2009; Calem, Gillen, &
Wachter, 2004; Lees, 2000; Williams et al., 2005; Wyly, 2011). This process is laborious
and requires experience at parsing through the non-standardized mortgage and deed
forms. Errors in data recording preclude the researcher from trusting historical sales
data obtained from the county5 except at larger scales. The small number of case
studies, a total of about 1% of the homes in each sample were examined in this fashion,
in relationship to the total number of properties in each neighborhood presents difficulty
in assigning any causal relationship. The studies are a good indication of the general
pattern of investment in each area. The process used to select homes for use as case
studies is as follows. Working from a parcel map of the sample neighborhood properties
were selected in ArcGIS. Homes that possessed a spatial quality that might influence
their sales histories, such as homes on a major road, waterfront homes, or homes
located on or near a corner were eliminated from consideration. Of the homes chosen
as case studies a small segment were singled out for representation in graph form that
allows the reader a clearer picture of the progression of lending patterns at the this
level. Again, the small sample size reduces the effectiveness of this method is assigning
5

When reviewing countywide parcel data it is common to discover errors or missing sales data.
At such a small scale it is only by reviewing the original documents filed with the clerk can the
researcher be assured that the datum for each property is accurate.
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a causal relationship between lending patterns and turnover but provides a small scale
context that is missing from the existing literature that confines its focus to the metro or
tract scare only.
Additionally, the property appraiser’s office files including every sale of a single
family home on file with the county back as far as the 1930s. This data can be used to
reconstruct the history of property sales for the sample neighborhoods and compare
them with the county as a whole. This method allows the identification of local
variations in sales patterns that can be related to the patterns of investment and
disinvestment in different neighborhoods identified in the literature. It also avoids the
pitfalls of our small number of case studies by allowing a review of every transaction in
each neighborhood over the entire study period. Using SPSS and ArcGIS software the
records of sales histories for homes located in the three sample neighborhoods are
isolated from the rest of the county. These sales records are then reviewed to remove
those with obvious errors. The most common error was in how the sale was recorded
by the Clerk’s office. Sales are noted as either being unqualified or qualified based on if
the sale was considered to be an ‘open market’ sale (qualified for use in determining
taxable values) or if it was a private transfer of property (as in the case of inheritance).
Unqualified sales have a nominal value entered as the sales price and if included in the
sample with depress the overall price of the neighborhood. Furthermore, properties
with sales prices far in excess of the neighborhood were excluded, typically these were
unique properties, oversized homes, estates, farms, or waterfront properties. The
resulting records are an accurate representation of the long term sales process at work
in each neighborhood.
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Finally, a review of historic records such as neighborhood histories, media
articles, and interviews with are reviewed for indications of changing patterns of
turnover within the sample communities. These sources are highly subjective but
provide a method of analyzing the social networks present in each neighborhood over
time. These histories of changing social structures can then be compared with periods
identified in the literature when changes to mortgage finance structures occurred. While
this method will most likely not produce results which can prove a causal relationship
between mortgage finance and social networks within these neighborhoods it will
suggest whether relationships identified in the literature between the fraying of social
networks due to neighborhood structure hold true in the sample neighborhoods and
provide a humanistic, personal context to the data that is often missing in discussions
about capital flow and foreclosure patterns.
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Seminole Heights – Core neighborhood

Figure 4 Seminole Heights, Florida. On the left is Central Avenue and Comanche Street
dated 1922. Note the vacant lots being prepared for sale by the addition or streets and
utility poles. (Courtesy, Tampa-Hillsborough County Public Library System) On the right is
a Seminole Heights home today.

Seminole Heights is a historic neighborhood near the urban center of Tampa. It
has experienced intensive gentrification over the last twenty years as described in other
urban areas where pioneers and gentrifiers replaced the original residents (Lees, 2000;
Lengell, 2003; Wyly & Hammel, 1999). This is representative of the ‘urban pioneer’
effect that Wyly notes in his work in the areas of Baltimore. Inexpensive housing
options such as cheap apartments or massive public housing structures are cleared to
make way for upscale ‘city-homes’ and older neighborhoods are bought out while the
structures are either replaced or remodeled. A review of local newspaper articles and
advertisements reveals a progression in the history of Seminole Heights.
At the time of its founding, Seminole Heights was a northern extension of the
growing city of Tampa. Prior to the creation of the GSEs home buyers were often
unable to secure a mortgage from a traditional bank. This resulted in the sale of
properties as raw land, with the buyer ultimately responsible for the construction of a
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home on the property when they became able to do so. This process lead to a
neighborhood of homes that varies both in age and quality. Residents of the area
interviewed for this study indicated a preference for the older style of homes and a lack
of interest in the larger size of home in the other samples. Regardless of the size of the
property or the home Seminole Heights became a highly sought after community and
remains culturally vibrant today. It is home to one of the city’s few urban gardens,
located on private property, and residents interviewed for this thesis stress the
convenience of the location and the attraction of the eclectic local businesses that fill the
nearby commercial spaces.
Advertisements for the area bragged of big lots and fruit trees in the early part
of the 20th century ("A Few Specials for Sale," 1912). Tampa was expanding from its
traditional home close to the Fort Brooke, the frontier era symbol of protection from
hostile Native Americans. The new lots of Seminole Heights quickly filled with
bungalows and craftsmen homes that still exist today, but the neighborhood itself would
slip into decline. Problems persisted from drug cultivation ("10 Face Dope Charges,"
1964) to rampant prostitution (Stanley, 1993, 1994). There is a change in tone in the
middle part of the 1990s in Seminole Heights. Articles begin to focus on the rising
property values (Drayton, 1998), the quaint homes, the big yards, and the fruit trees.
Thematically the story of Seminole Heights turns from one of crime, violence,
and degradation (Stanley, 1994) to one of wealth (Lengell, 2003), history, exclusivity,
and Starbucks (Steele, 2005)6. Pioneers and gentrifiers bought up dilapidated
bungalows and renovated them. Funded by booming sources of sub-prime credit during
6

The opening of the Seminole Heights location of Starbucks can be said to be a signpost of the
complete gentrification of the neighborhood. The original urban pioneers, who feared the traffic
that the location would attract, had viciously resisted the store.
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the 1990s, Seminole Heights is an excellent example of a ‘place’ that could attract
capital flows (Immergluck, 2009b; Lees, 2000; Lengell, 2003; Smith, 2002). It does so
via a collusion of actors, local activists and residents that seek to define and promote it,
local mortgage and real estate professionals that ‘farm’ it for clients, and the lenders
willing to seek non-traditional neighborhoods for investment that heretofore were
ignored by traditional funding sources. This period resulted in a large
Three properties have been selected from Seminole Heights for closer
examination. All were built when the neighborhood was first formed in the 1920s. All
are of similar construction, wood frame home on pillars. All are also single family
homes. In these regards these houses are identical to the majority of homes in this
historic urban neighborhood and provide a strong indication of how properties have
been bought and financed during the study period of 1965-2010. These three
properties display characteristics in their sales and lending histories with the majority of
documented sales reviewed for this study. For the purposes of this study it can be
assumed that these histories are typical of the area.
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Figure 5 Parcel map of Seminole Heights. (Hillsborough County, 2010)
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Figure 6 Sales and mortgage history for 504 Frierson Ave. (Hillsborough County, 2010)

As seen in Figure 6, the older sales were funded via a combination of small bank
loans and private loans. The seller of the home often financed the private loans. As
Wyly indicates in his work, these inner ring, urban neighborhoods witnessed a flight of
capital that often precluded the conservative traditional banks from pursuing lending in
these areas (Wyly, 2011). During this period of rampant redlining and blatant racism,
an urban neighborhood noted for having high incidences of crime and poverty was not a
magnet for bank lending ("10 Face Dope Charges," 1964; Been, 2009; McCartney, 2005;
Shlay, 2006; Williams et al., 2005). In order to create a property market the seller had
to be willing to hold a private mortgage, where the buyer would remit payment directly
to them in an agreed upon fashion. This process retarded the property market and
prevented resident turnover by reducing the options available for those wishing to buy a
home in this sample.
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Figure 7 Sales and mortgage history of 5002 Central Ave.(Hillsborough
County, 2010)

For these reasons the period prior to liberalization of the mortgage system in
Seminole Heights was notable for its stability; the samples show very few instances of
sales prior to the 1990s. However, beginning in the 90s all of the properties display a
trend of sale and refinance at increasing levels. Figures 7 and 9 show that two sample
properties from Seminole Heights saw dramatic increases in either the amount of money
the property could be mortgaged for, the number of sales between different owners, or
a combination of the two. HMDA data reveals a sharp increase in the number of loans
approved from Seminole Heights furing this period as well as a dramatic increase in the
amount of these loan, rising from $4,116,000 in loan activity in the census tract which
the sample is located in 1999 to $16,294,000 just three years later in 2002 (see Table 1,
following page). Figure 8 is a plot of all sales activity in the Seminole Heights during
the study period. The late 90s through early 2000.
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Figure 8 Historic sales of Seminole Heights homes from 1965-2010.(Hillsborough County,
2010)

Table 1 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data on loans sold and total loan amounts for
the three sample neighborhoods.(HMDA, 2010)
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Figure 9 Sales and mortgage history for 6001 Central Ave.(Hillsborough County, 2010)
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Carrollwood – Semi-periphery

Figure 10 A lake and surrounding land in the area that would become Carrollwood, 1922.
(Courtesy, Tampa-Hillsborough County Public Library System). On the right a typical home in
Carrollwood. Note the large lot and larger home than in Seminole Heights.

The suburb of Carrollwood is located north of the original urban area of Tampa.
The city has since enveloped this suburb and now it is part of the county’s urban
landscape. Formerly a land of farms and pastures, Carrollwood was a planned suburb of
Tampa where construction began in the late 1950s. By the 1990s, articles begin to
lament the urbanization of this formerly quiet suburb (Grant, 2003; Snyder, 1990). By
the end of this decade, the community continued to grow but there was a renewed
focus on maintaining the ‘suburban-ness’ of it. This was achieved by focusing on
developing the qualitative features of the community as a whole (Lim, 2004). Few of
the worries regarding crime that Seminole Heights was grappling with were apparent
from the news reports of the time (Jackie, 1993). By the latter half of the decade
following 2000 the tone changed and concerns over mounting foreclosures became
apparent (Sager, 2010). Table 1 reveals these fears were largely unfounded, as
foreclosures remained extremely rare in Carrollwood as compared with the other sample
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neighborhoods. Regardless of these fears, Carrollwood retains close ties to the urban
core of Tampa and remains a highly desirable area to settle in.
The properties selected as case studies of Carrollwood display characteristics
common to all of the homes built when this community was designed. All are of block
construction, on lots much larger than the homes of the older community of Seminole
Heights, and tend to be much larger than those homes as well. This reflects several

Figure 11 Sales and mortgage history for 10601 Lake Carroll Way.
(Hillsborough County, 2010)
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historical changes that any study of neighborhoods must take into account.
At the time that Seminole Heights was developed it was difficult to obtain a
mortgage and for the developer the most profitable method was to sell off individual lots
to prospective homeowners and allow them to build their own home, allowing the
buyers to pay them on in installments. By the 1960s, when Carrollwood was initially
constructed, homeownership was within the grasp of a much larger portion of the public
due to the rise of the GSEs, which provided an incentive for banks to offer as many
mortgages as they could. Figure 11 shows the sales and lending history for a
Carrollwood home and notes that all of the lending activity involved traditional
depository banks or thrifts rather than the personal loans and lending companies that
appear in the Seminole Heights examples. Banks could choose to keep a mortgage on
their books or, if in need of cash or worried about the status of the mortgage, sell it off
to the GSE at will. This created an environment where the profit latent in new homes
far exceeded that in vacant land. Qualitative improvements were utilized to attract
buyers to particular homes; size, comfort, privacy, and quality of construction.
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Figure 12 Parcel map of Carrollwood. (Hillsborough County, 2010)

The sample properties demonstrate the success of this design. The entire
sample shows very little propensity for sale during the initial years of the study period.
As Figures 13 and 14 demonstrate, by the late 1990s through 2009 sales increased both
in frequency and in sales amount. Loan to value rates also began to creep upward,
although not as high as was observed in the Seminole Heights sample. More frequently
observed is a reduced likelihood that this activity would result in property sale or lis

50

pendens filing, indicating an increase in social stability as homeowners tend to remain in
place for some time. In fact this is the only sample neighborhood that includes
examples of mortgages allowed to amortize over a full 30 year period, regardless of the
fact that Seminole Heights had a much longer period and theoretically should have
entered the study period with a much more stable social network in place.

Figure 13 Mortgage and sales history for 10708 Carrollwood Dr. Note the
long period of stability followed by successive stripping of equity from the
home. This appears to be less common in Carrollwood than the other
samples.(Hillsborough County, 2010)
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Figure 14 Sales history of Carrollwood for the period 1965-2010. Note the muted effect of the
housing boom.(Hillsborough County, 2010)
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Cross Creek - Periphery

Figure 15 Cross Creek housing.

Cross Creek is a master planned community to the far north of the county. It is
recently built and represents a true ‘suburb’ in the sense that it is culturally and
physically removed from the urban areas of Tampa. Founded during the highest point
of the housing boom, Cross Creek is at the furthest limits of the Tampa MSA
(Metropolitan Service Area). There is a familiar pattern to the news reports about Cross
Creek when read after those of the other sample areas. The headlines relish the natural
open spaces (Jeff, 1989) and opportunities (George, 2001b; Lengell, 2003) but quickly
turn to the downfalls of developmental success. Complaints rise about traffic (George,
2001a; Susan, 2000), rising prices, and crime becomes a major concern as foreclosure
leaves many homes empty (Marlene, 2010). The area surrounding Cross Creek has
witnessed what may be a permanent exit of capital as the ongoing recession refocuses
capital investment on areas closer to commercial centers.
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The sub-sample of Cross Creek homes reviewed for this thesis is substantially
different than our first two samples. Primarily this is due to the lack of data available in
this much younger neighborhood. However, it is possible to extract patterns from even
this short period due to the uncharacteristically high frequency of sale and mortgage
data observed in these properties. As figures 17 and 18 demonstrate, the typical home
in Cross Creek saw a much faster pace of sales and a uniformly high LTV ratio pattern.
The historic sales charted on Figure 16 show a marked spike in prices in the early 2000s
that is much more prominent that in the Seminole Heights sales of Figure Every
property selected shows foreclosure activity at some point in its history and all save one
of the properties is currently valued less than its initial sales price. Another difference
between this sample and the previous two is the conspicuous absence of traditional
lenders from the mortgage documents. The vast majority of the lending activity seems
to originate with lending companies with the notable exception of Bank of America. This
pattern matches again with the literature which points towards new markets as being
slow to attract traditional banks for the more aggressive lending style of mortgage
companies that intended on holding none of their loans in portfolio (Agnew, 2010; Been,
2009; Gotham, 2009; Wyly, 2011). It is possible to infer that the willingness of these
lending companies to move into new, unproven markets was their intention of reselling
the resulting debt, either to the GSE for conforming borrowers or to private label
securities for loans that exceeded loan limits based on borrower qualification or housing
price. The apparent failure of such procedures to produce viable, stable neighborhoods
appears to be evident in the mortgage and deed recorded on the sample properties;
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frequent sales, foreclosure, and refinanced mortgages are not signs of a socially stable
area.
These sample neighborhoods match closely with those studied by Wyly and
should provide a representative cross-section of the larger population of Tampa housing.
Seminole Heights represents the old growth, urban neighborhood. Carrollwood is typical
of the initial post-War suburban push to abandon the city. Cross Creek is a prototypical
creation of easy credit terms, converting farmland and pastures into brand new
residential areas.
The literature identifies broadly defined patterns of neighborhood investment
that change over time with the availability of credit to homeowners. Times of easily
available credit lead to a general push to deregulate the mortgage process and there is
a push outward from urban areas in a pattern generally referred to as sprawl that leads
to the creation of new exurbs such as Cross Creek, separated from the urban core
spatially and culturally. Although examples existed of inner city investment during the
housing boom of the late 1990s though 2008, the gentrification period of the sample
neighborhood of Seminole Heights being a good example, the majority of the capital
was directed towards these new peripheral exurbs. When Wyly examined this
phenomenon he determined that the investment of the period in inner city, urban
neighborhoods was limited to a certain segment of borrowers. These ‘urban pioneers’
tended to be either younger or older than the average homeowners of the region, with a
disproportionate number of them male. Female borrowers, as well as the traditional
heterosexual family of both male and female borrowers, tended to eschew both the
urban and exurban fringe neighborhoods, gravitating towards the suburban semiperiphery that provides both the security they sought as well as the social networks and
55

work opportunities the household needed to resolve the complex social and professional
needs of working mothers (Hayden, 2002; Wyly, 2011).

Figure 16 Sales history of Cross Creek. Although this community is much newer than the other
two samples note the sharp rise and decline in prices. (Hillsborough County, 2010)

Both core and peripheral neighborhoods can be thought of as part of the
‘psychological fringe’ where the rapid expansion of predatory and non-traditional lenders
hyper-inflated the housing market. Both of these neighborhoods suffered the effects of
this hyperactivity, the explosion of mortgage dollars flowing into Seminole Heights
effectively stripped it bare of equity while the homes of Cross Creek were never allowed
to opportunity to accrue any. This was due in no small part to pressure to expand home
lending in these ‘fringe’ areas as part of the liberalized mortgage policy changes. In line
with the literature on the subject the presence of powerful, unfettered capital and a
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deregulated environment placed enormous pressure on urban neighborhoods to reflect
the image they wished to present via sometimes revanchist policies. In our sample
community of Seminole Heights this took the form of several notable actions, the
construction of a wall limiting access to part of the neighborhood to vehicle traffic
(Cindy, 2000), the approval of a Starbucks (Steele, 2005) franchise, the enforcement of
severe historical limitations on private property within designated historic areas of the
neighborhood, and active neighborhood campaigns against vagrancy and prostitution
(McCartney, 2005) as well as the rapid turnover in residents suggested by the data in
Tables 1 and 4.
Lending to these ‘fringe’ neighborhoods, such as the Seminole Heights and Cross
Creek communities, as identified in case studies on several homes in each area seem to
reinforce the patterns identified by the majority of the literature. Prior to the
liberalization of credit in the early 1990s there was an obvious lack of supply side
pressure to lend in either area. Cross Creek was, in fact, still a natural setting of
individual homesteads and farmland. Seminole Heights was a more complicated issue.
Records indicate that the sales that were recorded were more often than not financed
either by savings from the borrower or by seller financed mortgages7. Bank loans found
in the records tended to be for relatively small amounts in comparison to purchase
prices and were the minority of transactions until at least the very late 1980s. Lending
to this neighborhood began in earnest with the period of gentrification identified in the
neighborhood history during the 1990s. However, upon review of these mortgages it is
clear that the lenders who were most active were not traditional banks, but rather

7

A seller financed mortgage occurs when a mortgage is recorded granting the seller a mortgage
where the buyer agrees to pay a certain amount at closing, and then a monthly payment that
includes interest to the seller for a defined period of time, normally no more than ten years.
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mortgage finance companies that can be assumed to have immediately sold or assigned
their exposure to Wall Street rather quickly via the securitization process. This clearly
reflects two trends identified in other cities by the literature, the aversion to lending in
fringe areas by the traditional banks and the likelihood that lending would only occur in
these areas should the lender be able to transfer the risk to others (Wyly, 2000).
This pattern was clearly replicated in Cross Creek as the majority of mortgages
were also made by finance companies. In part this was determined by the developers,
who often internalized the initial loan process. As a former loan originator with a builder
interviewed for this thesis described it, the builder discovered that were they to attract a
buyer and then leave them to devise their own financing they often failed to close the
sale. By internalizing the loan process they increased the chances of a smooth closing
and also captured a portion of the profit the loan process created (S.C, 2012). This
follows a familiar pattern of vertical integration in the loan process and reflects a
maturation of the industry. This is notable for its speed, fringe neighborhoods went in a
very short period, perhaps ten years, from a market served by seller financed mortgages
recorded between individuals to industrialized chains of loan production where the
interests of the lender and borrowers were completely severed (Gotham, 2009). Table 1
reveals a shockingly high velocity of increasing capital flow between 2003 and 2006.
While Carrollwood shows a 70% increase in total volume in 2006 over 2003 levels Cross
Creek and Seminole Heights posted increases of 92% and 240% respectively. These
rapid increases in capital flows into neighborhoods increase the pressure on current
residents to either sell out the new homeowners or strip equity from their homes to use
for other purposes. While the outright sale of a home has an obvious impact on tenure
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refinancing is identified in the literature as a precursor to neighborhood change as well
(Been, Ellen, & Madar; Calem et al., 2004; Mayer, 2008; Strauss, 2009; Wyly, 2011).

Figure 17 Mortgage and sales history of 10338 Goldenbrook Way. Note that the frequency of
sales is very high. The initial owner lost the home to foreclosure within a year of purchase.
(Hillsborough County, 2010)

Fringe area mortgages from the 1990s onward also shared a relatively high loanto-value (LTV) ratio that the non-fringe area, Carrollwood, lacked. Where the seller
financed mortgages of the pre-liberal period in Seminole Heights normally included a
substantial downpayment, as the interest of the lender in the long term solvency of the
borrower was severed the LTV ratios began to first creep, and then explode, upward.
This resulted in a number of mortgages made in Seminole Heights as late as 2006 that
were found to be close to 100% of the value of the home, essentially meaning the buyer
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was completely dependent upon the maintenance of the home’s value and their
continued ability to pay to remain ‘right side up’ on their mortgage. In Cross Creek the
vast majority of mortgages, even those to the initial owners from the builder, were well
over 80% LTV. As home values increased homeowners were often observed to
continually refinance their loans for larger amounts of money, indicating they were
taking much of the loan amount as cash at closing for other purposes, keeping their
homes nearly fully mortgaged at all times.

Figure 18 Mortgage and sales history of 10226 Grant Creek Drive. Note
the high Loan-to-value (LTV) ratio and frequency of sales in this Cross
Creek home. (Hillsborough County, 2010)

Lending in the Carrollwood sub-sample, however, reflected different patterns
from the fringe areas. Although there were examples of refinance activity it seems to
have been the exception rather than the rule. Lending activity typically occurred only at
the same time as a sale, and the LTV rates tended to be more in line with traditional
lending. Also, the appearance of mortgage finance companies in the court filed
mortgages is much lower than in the fringe areas. Traditional retail banks and credit
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unions make up a much larger portion of the lender activity in this sample than either of
the others. This also reflects the larger patterns noted in the literature, where suburbs
continued to attract more capital from traditional lending sources. Whether this
propensity for traditional lenders to remain in the stable suburbs is due to their
preference for keeping mortgages they sold rather than reselling them on a secondary
market, or that the buyers that the literature identifies as preferring these areas, the
heterosexual nuclear family, also prefer traditional loan sources is unclear.
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Part IV: Stakeholder Viewpoints on Homeownership and Lending in Sample
Neighborhoods

My parents think we’re crazy for living here. But when the housing market crashed we
could finally afford a house. – Seminole Heights resident
Stakeholder interviews are important to understanding not just the effects of
neighborhood churn but also the factors that could increase the tenure of some
neighborhoods at the expense of others. For this thesis a small number of interviews
were conducted with resident, neighborhood leaders, community activists, and lenders
to obtain a humanistic viewpoint of the processes and consequences of excessive
turnover in residential neighborhoods.
When first asked why she had chosen a home in the Seminole Heights
neighborhood R.H. commented that her parents, residents of a more traditional suburb
of Tampa similar to Carrollwood, did not approve of the neighborhood. Unable to buy in
the hyper-active market that existed pre-crash she and her husband waited out this
period of rapid turnover (R.H., 2012). When they bought their home in 2010 it was a
fraction of the cost that they would have paid two years prior. The subject noted that
she rarely saw any example of resident turnover in her location, with most of the
neighbors remaining for the two years she has been there. A lifelong resident of the
community commented that he was raised in Seminole Heights and chose to return to it
because of the identifiable history and style of homes as well as the unique qualities of
the neighborhood. He laments the rapid churn in both residential and commercial
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spaces and sees the strength of people proud to settle down in Seminole Heights as the
greatest benefit to the community (D.H., 2012).
Table 2 Comparison of prices, value, and qualitative features of all three Neighborhoods.
(Hillsborough County, 2010)
Sample
Mean Sales Amount Mean Acerage Mean Effective Age Mean Area of Home Mean Current Value
Seminole Heights
108495
0.17
1973
1421
85110
Carrollwood
152099
0.348
1990
2278
210025
Cross Creek
189431
0.18
2006
2083
128756

Neighborhood reactions to the increase in available credit and its sudden
withdrawal
As discussed above, the young homeowners of Seminole Heights noted it was
the withdrawal of credit options that allowed them to afford a home. This contradicts
the typical housing policy that easily obtained credit allows increased home ownership.
The elimination of supply-side pressure on prices, and the resulting collapse of housing
prices that has destabilized large swaths of the economy, has had the converse effect of
rewarding hitherto renters who can now choose their neighborhoods with a great deal
more freedom than previously. It is these choices that drive the patterns of investment
that much of the literature focuses on, with core neighborhoods seeing an influx of the
limited credit now available to home buyers. The interviews reveal a clear pattern of
positive responses from owners in these core and semi-peripheral areas, for whom this
continued or resurgent investment they feel validates their housing choice over that of
the exurban homeowners. It also indicates a reduced propensity for churn as supply
side pressures fade.
Among homeowners in the outer ring suburb of Cross Creek the concerns about
the post-crash mortgage environment are more negative (M.D., 2012). Frequently,
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crime is mentioned in the interviews as being a major concern. One resident of the
Cross Creek area noted that he was thankful that the neighborhood had a manned
guard post since many of the nearby homes and multi-family units had been converted
to Section 8 housing8, which he blamed for an influx of criminals to the area. This
impression, that poverty rates in the exurban communities increased post-crash, is
reinforced by the literature (Garr & Kneebone, 2010). Increased density and a high
number of nearby muilti-family units coupled with increasing gentrification of urban
areas requires the dispersion of poor populations to areas of disinvestment, in this case
Cross Creek. One resident noted that many homes were being bought by area realtors
as speculative investments prior to the crash. When asked what happened to those
homes he replied that most were either sitting vacant or hosted a revolving population
of renters (S.C, 2012). These two residents both noted that tenure issues remain an
majr issue in their community, be it the revolving cast of renters that are blamed for
rising crime in the area or a continual pattern of sale and foreclosure that they blame for
depressing their home values.
Table 3 Housing density. (Hillsborough County, 2010)

Area
Number of Single
Family Homes
Density - Homes per
Sq Km
Miles of Street

Seminole Heights

Carrollwood

Cross Creek

0.89497 Square
Kilometers
673 Homes

3.533971 Square
Kilometers
1535 Homes

1.088348 Square
Kilometers
835 Homes

751.98 Homes/SqKm

434.36 Homes/SqKm

767.22 Homes/SqKm

17.77 Km
19.855 Km/SqKm

38.22 KM
10.815 Km/SqKm

12.71 Km
11.68 Km/SqKm

8

This refers to housing converted to rental use and occupied by low-income residents who
receive a voucher for all or a portion of their rent.
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An community leader in Carrollwood noted that he attributed the lack of
excessive turnover in residents to the qualitative factors of the community. As noted in
Table 2 the homes of Carrollwood are larger than either of the other neighborhoods and
sit on lots that are far larger that the dense communities of Seminole Heights and Cross
Creek.
Discussion with stakeholders regarding home finance

The bottom line was this new line of financing was like a snowflake at the top of the
mountain rolling downhill – Loan originator
When discussing the impact of mortgage finance upon the environment in which
the homeowner lives, the interviewer encounters several obstacles to parsing the real
effect of mortgage liberalization from other factors that contribute to the presence or
erosion of social networks in the sample neighborhoods. This is largely the result of a
steep learning curve imposed on the stakeholder who seeks to try and understand the
true motivations of the loan originator, the opaque nature of the loan process, and the
inability of even the savvy home investor to discern what happens to their loan after
closing. However, it can also be the effect of secondary effects of the built environment
wrought by the design of these communities. In his work examining the fraying of
social bonds due to sprawl Freeman notes that it is rise of the hegemony of the
automobile, exacerbated in neighborhoods such as Cross Creek which require
substantial trips by car to job centers or even the closest commercial areas. Freeman
notes that automobile centric development is, “inimical to social ties (Freeman, 2001).”
The young residents of Seminole Heights, two years after the purchase of their first
home, still seemed at a loss to explain how they obtained their mortgage and how their
interest rate was selected. “All I know,” the young homeowner noted, “was that after
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my father started talking with the broker our rates went down a lot (R.H., 2012).” At
the other end of the spectrum the Cross Creek resident noted that they had significant
cash to put down on their home and were able to only borrow half of the money needed
for his purchase in 2002. He noted that the biggest obstacle to their success had been
resisting the offers to refinance and pay off other debts with the equity in their home. A
loan originator with extensive experience in home lending during this period of
liberalization noted that he often went to great lengths to explain the loan he was
obtaining for the homeowner, only to be met with blank stares at the complexity
seemingly inherent in the process.
This lack of comprehension of the true cost of owning a home would have
consequences, as the mortgage industry was revolutionized by neo-liberal philosophy
and capital flowed through to consumer like water through a cracked dam. One banker
who worked in the industry from 1980-2009 was asked to describe what he saw as the
turning point in mortgage lending this was his response,
The 90s were definitely a period of change from "traditional" financing
sources be it commercial banks, FHA, VA, FNMA & FHLMC. As a lender
and originator, I saw a huge influx of private money mortgage
companies. This was also the infancy of what I categorize as the true
"sub-prime" lenders. … The bottom line was this new line of financing
was like a snowflake at the top of the mountain rolling downhill. These
lenders funded anything that would stick and then they sold loans as
mortgage backed securities on the secondary market. This, as they say,
was the beginning of the end. These lending practices carried on for the
next 10-15 years until the credit crisis really hit in the mid-2000s and
federal regulators got caught with their fingers in the proverbial cookie
jar. As you know, credit guidelines constricted after all of these practices
came to light and we are now seeing credit-worthy borrowers being
denied loans by lenders and investors. The ironic thing is, if these were
the type of customers that they would have stuck with all along we never
would have gotten into this situation (S.C, 2012).
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Part V: Conclusions
This thesis has attempted to blend the parallel narratives of existing literature on
gentrification and finance, the spatial organization of communities, the cold records of
property, and the opinions and desires of real people into a more nuanced view of the
mechanisms at work in our neighborhoods today than we currently possess. As the
regulatory framework constraining how mortgages are funded was dismantled, capital
flooded this system (Immergluck, 2009a). By the late 1990s, this flood began to have a
dramatic impact on the landscape as new exurban communities were constructed in
response to the unprecedented levels of available credit and the release of pent up
demand as buyers previously denied lending options were solicited by mortgage
originators (S.C, 2012). Traditional lenders remained focused on existing mid- to upperclass suburbs for their lending but non-traditional lenders began marketing themselves
heavily in areas where the banks refused to go. Thus, newer neighborhoods on the
periphery and older, urban neighborhoods near the inner city saw massive increases in
investment from non-traditional sources (Wyly, 2000). The literature provides ample
support that these lenders were predatory in nature, and often saddled homeowners,
regardless of credit risk, with loans that they could neither afford nor fully understand
(Been, 2009; S.C, 2012; Stone, 1975; Strauss, 2009; Williams et al., 2005; Wyly, 2011;
Wyly et al., 2006). This deluge of capital resulted in dramatic increases in mortgages to
purchase homes as well as refinances that sapped neighborhoods of the equity that
represented to accumulation of years or decades of wealth. This has resulted in
increased foreclosure activity and, as this process of liberalization progressed, lead to a
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collapse in prices as capital fled the market. The resulting loss in value associated with
this ‘bubble’ effectively wiped out any equity or profit enjoyed by homeowners, with a
disproportionate amount of this value loss located in the urban neighborhoods and new
suburbs. The stable home ownership patterns of the period preceding the liberalization
of the mortgage market would indicate that both the rampant speculation caused by
securitization and the brutal devaluation of property since the crash of the market have
resulted in an increase in the frequency of sale, refinance, and foreclosure, all of which
are identified with increased resident turnover and disintegrating social ties. Times of
economic health push finance capital into real estate ventures further from the urban
core and recession halts this process and redirects a portion of the investment back to
urban neighborhoods (Newman, 2004a). The findings of this thesis clearly demonstrate
that financial tools and policies do not simply “hang above” the political economy or
exist outside of the spatial or social structures of our neighborhoods. New financial
realities set the market terms and rules of (dis)investment in the built environment
(Weber, 2002).
As expected from the literature, rapid changes in the velocity of capital flow to a
neighborhood can have the effect of exacerbating resident turnover (Florida et al., 2011;
Immergluck, 2009a; Newman, 2004b; Wyly & Hammel, 1999). Findings of the study
were that with the increase in lending brought about by securitization and liberalization
of mortgage policy a frenzy of sale and refinance activity followed. Table 1 (page 46)
derived from HMDA data and Table 4 (page 70) based on case histories from our sample
communities, both clearly show a rapid expansion of purchase loans, refinancing, and
foreclosures in concentrated in the communities of Cross Creek and Seminole Heights.
This activity was heavily focused in the core and peripheral areas largely ignored by the
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traditional depository lending institutions. In a pattern clearly replicated in the
literature, the neighborhoods of Tampa displayed a pattern of rapid expansion of nontraditional lending focused on areas such as Seminole Heights, which had been largely
ignored by traditional lenders for the preceding 40 years, and Cross Creek, where
builders sought lenders to insure the viability of their business model and internalized
elements of non-traditional lending in an effort to guarantee the ability to close loans
and capture even more profit (S.C, 2012). These activities were made possible by the
creation of demand via deregulation of mortgage policy and the additional capital flow
afforded by privately issued mortgage backed securities (Gotham, 2006, 2009). The
severed bonds between lender and borrowers cited by Gotham and the absence of
traditional, and perhaps more cautious, funding sources in the core and peripheral
communities had a direct impact on the high turnover of profit seeking owners leading
up to the housing crash, more accurately the credit crash, of 2008 and in subsequent
years the churn of ownership caused by a persistent pattern of foreclosure and short
sales.
Table 4 Incidents of sale, refinance, and foreclosure for each sample per 1000 homes.
(Hillsborough County, 2010)
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As Figure 19 demonstrates on the following page, the effect on prices leading up
to the crash was highly dependent on the community involved. While Carrollwood
remained resistant to the upward pressure on prices that caused intense spikes in the
other two samples it also suffered no subsequent crash in prices as demonstrated by
plotting sales figures from the last sale of every property in the community by date.
When compared with the overall sales figures for the entire county, Figure 20, it is clear
that although the individual properties have lost value the crash seems to have returned
the housing market to a pre-liberalization pattern of gradual increase. This is little
comfort to owners upside down on a mortgage and looking for a way out or to
communities that had budgeted for future tax revenues based on assumptions about tax
revenue that ended with the crash.
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Figure 19 Side by side comparison of sales histories of all three neighborhoods. Note, these
figures are not adjusted for inflation. Each point represents that most recent sale of a
particular property in the sample neighborhood. (Hillsborough County, 2010)
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Figure 20 Sales history of every property in Hillsborough County over the study period. Note
the impact of the housing boom. Each point represents a single sale of a home in Hillsborough
County. Older sales were often just recorded with the year of sale which results in the pattern
of lines visible on the left. (Hillsborough County, 2010)

However, these metro scale explanations of the current mortgage situation do
not fully explain the patterns of investment that this study reveals when all of the data is
viewed concurrently at the local level. Carrollwood remains remarkably stable when
measured against not just the other two sample communities but also against the
county as a whole. In part this is likely due to the likelihood identified in the literature
that the inner ring suburbs will retain residents and investment capital more than urban
or exurban communities. Carrollwood also possesses several differences in built
environment from the other samples, notably the larger lot and home sizes identified.
These physical features are important to the maintenance of stable social groups and
the ability of the neighborhood to make itself desirable to capital as is identified in the
literature (Freeman, 2001; Song & Knapp, 2002).
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Valuation, commodification, overproduction, collapse, and rebirth can be said to
be the five stages of capitalism9. It should come as no surprise that as property became
successfully commodified it should be subject to the same rules as all the ‘post-industrial
widgets’ that are used every day (Immergluck, 2009b). Regardless of the fate of the
GSEs, President Obama has announced that the federal government would remain a
major player in the mortgage finance world. One can only assume that this means he
intends for the federal housing policy to continue promoting the sale of U.S. mortgage
debt via securitization. This dis-investment in housing and increasing investment in
housing debt destabilizes neighborhoods and essentially destroys individual places in its
goal of a uniform, homogenized collateral product.
Property remains different, regardless of this overwhelming push for
commodification. Despite the extensive effort expended to dilute what Weber calls the
‘quirky’ nature of property, it remains unlike any other investment vehicle (Weber,
2002). Its physical location and dependence on long term physical properties that
cannot easily be changed, such as the size of the home and the construction materials
used in it, these variables in the built environment have an effect on the long term
turnover of residents. When long term sales price histories are plotted a steady, gradual
increase is seen in all three samples and in the county as a whole. This period, the
‘golden age’ of Immergluck, underscores the ability of property to maintain value over
long periods when properly regulated. However, with securitization all three samples
began to see increases in sales prices. Carrollwood’s increase was more modest than
the other two samples. Lower frequency of sale and far lower rates of refinance and

9

Comparable to the five stages of grief: denial, anger, bargaining, depression, and acceptance.
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foreclosure reduced the ability for sales prices in Carrollwood to rise as quickly as those
in the other neighborhoods and reduced the rate of resident turnover.
Limits to this study include the absence of broad based, long term, local level
data on mortgage and capital investment. As noted by Wyly, the presence of small
scale data on lending is a recent phenomenon, beginning in 1990. This study attempts
to look at a longer time period. This requires the manual review of individual court
documents filed with the Clerk’s office for a selection of properties. This practice
necessarily reduces the number of properties that can be reviewed. While the
methodology attempts to ensure these are sample properties that are representative of
the neighborhood as a whole a future area of research would be to greatly expand the
number of homes subjective to the case study process. Additionally, the process of
locating interview subjects is a social one, and at the time of this writing was just
beginning to bear real fruit. The small number of interviews covered here provide
anecdotal support for the other lines of research at best.
Ideally, this research could be expanded to include larger number of interviews
and surveys to create a more complete picture of the motivations of homebuyers, rather
than relying on the anecdotal evidence of a few key stakeholders. Two courses of
research can be pursued immediately based on this thesis. The first would be an
increase in the depth of the current research design. Social contacts that produced the
interviews in this study were beginning to mature at the time of this writing, additional
interviews with stakeholders would add greatly to our understanding of the stability or
instability created by the liberalized mortgage process. Alternatively, one neighborhood
could be selected for a more in depth historical analysis of changing social patterns and
investment patterns.
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Despite these limits, the findings of this study reinforce the work of Wyly when
he noted that the deregulation and securitization of the liberalized mortgage market
have removed the barriers that previously limited the investment in neighborhoods to
the valuable suburbs such as Carrollwood. Post-liberalization, capital flows were
redirected into the highly desirable neighborhoods near the urban core, such as
Seminole Heights, and new amenities-filled neighborhoods far outside the city such as
Cross Creek (Wyly & Hammel, 1999). Another avenue for future research would be the
increasing class distinctions created when there is no practical upper limit to the amount
of money a buyer can bid for a desirable property. This study has looked at the interneighborhood differences in lending and turnover patterns but a look at intraneighborhood. Finally, looking at multiple neighborhoods within the same band, such as
three core neighborhoods, would be ideal in order to eliminate the possibility of an
exceptional sample.
Regardless, this study makes it clear that the larger patterns of lending, finance,
and changing tenure at the metro scale observed in the literature hold true for the
sample communities in Tampa at the neighborhood level. The mortgage system of the
20th century was dismantled in order to attract additional capital flow and sweep away
the vestiges of racism and privilege that continued to exclude large numbers of people
from the ability to own a home. In its place rose a highly predatory system that fueled
a speculative market focused on areas underserved by traditional lending conduits. The
centrifugal effect of such a system is written across the urban landscape today, as the
wealthy are increasingly closed off behind communal compound walls, the middle class
is stranded in worthless tract homes, and the poor are increasingly crammed into
crumbling suburbs, semi-abandoned in the final days of the housing boom.
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Appendix A
Interview questions
Questions used in semi-structured interviews of stakeholders.
In what way are you familiar with [Sample Neighborhood]?
What drew you to [Sample Neighborhood]?
In approximately what year did you join or become associated with [Sample
Neighborhood]
In the time in which you have been associated with [Sample Neighborhood]
What changes have you noticed, if any?
What cultural or social amenities or networks were present which drew you
[Sample Neighborhood]?
What cultural or social amenities or networks do you now enjoy the most?
What do you see as the greatest benefit of this neighborhood?
What do you feel is the greatest threat, if any, to this neighborhood?
It is normal in day to day life to have social contact with people where you
discuss events or issues that concern you. In the past 6 months how many
people, outside of your own household or family, have you had such contact
with?
How many of those people live in [Sample Neighborhood]?
Questions used in interviews with lenders.
How between what years did you work in lending?
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Appendix A (Continued)
What drew you to the field of home lending?
How do you feel about government regulation of the mortgage industry?
What is one of the best memories of your time in home lending?
Is there a loan or client you regret or wish you had handled differently?
Were there particular neighborhoods that you focused on and if so why?
Did you prefer lending for a particular home type or neighborhood style and
why?
Did you offer what you would consider “sub-prime” loans? Negative
amortization?
How do you feel about the prospect of mortgage write-downs and their effect on
future home lending?
What would you consider an appropriate down payment for a homeowner?
Did you have concerns about the loans being offered prior to 2008? What
changes would you like to see to home lending moving forward?
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Appendix B
Additional Tables
Table B5 Case studies of properties from each sample: sales dates. (Hillsborough County,
2010)
Sales
Seminole Heights

1965-1969 1970-1974 1975-1979 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2010
307 E LAMBRIGHT ST

1

*

1

*

1

*

2

*

*

503 E POCAHONTAS AVE

*

*

1

*

*

*

1

1

*

5606 N BRANCH AVE

*

*

*

*

*

1

*

*

2

108 E NORTH ST

*

1

*

1

*

*

1

1

1

504 FRIERSON

*

1

*

2

2

*

*

1

2

5503 N SEMINOLE AVE

1

1

1

*

*

*

*

1

*

304 E NORTH ST

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

1

2

2

3

3

3

3

1

4

5

7

TOTAL
Carrollwood
Sales
3321 PICWOOD RD
11517 ARECA RD

*

*

*

*

1

*

*

*

*

11735 LIPSEY RD

*

1

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

12007 LAKE RIDGE RD

*

2

*

*

*

1

1

*

*

3024 SAMARA DR

1

*

1

*

1

*

*

*

*

3008 PEACOCK LN

1

*

*

*

*

*

*

2

*

11809 LIPSEY RD

*

1

*

*

3

*

*

*

*

10517 CARROLLVIEW DR

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

1

*

3320 VALENCIA RD

1

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

10908 JUNIPERUS PL

*

*

*

*

*

1

*

*

*

3109 BELMORE RD

*

1

2

1

2

*

*

*

*

10107 LINDELAAN DR

*

1

1

*

*

*

*

*

*

11718 PLUMOSA RD

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

1

*

3315 KORINA LN

*

*

*

*

1

*

1

1

2

10606 COQUITA LN

*

*

*

*

1

*

1

*

*

3324 VALENCIA RD

1

1

*

*

*

*

*

1

1

4

8

4

1

10

3

3

6

3

TOTAL
Sales
10317 MEADOW CROSSING DR

TOTAL

1965-1969 1970-1974 1975-1979 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2010
*
1
*
*
1
1
*
*
*

1965-1969 1970-1974 1975-1979 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2010
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
1

10338 GOLDENBROOK WAY

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

3

10226 GRANT CREEK DR

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

1

2

10326 BENEVA DR

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

1

1

10414 WILLARK WAY

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

1

2249 GUILFORD LN

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

1

10336 MEADOW CROSSING DR

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

1

10912 ANCIENT FUTURES DR

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

1

18216 BROOKPARK DR

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

2

10340 BIRDWATCH DR

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

2

18421 MEADOW BLOSSOM LN

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

2

1
15

5
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Appendix B (continued)
Table B6 Case studies of properties from each sample: refinance dates. (Hillsborough County,
2010)
Refinance
Seminole Heights

1965-1969 1970-1974 1975-1979 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2010
307 E LAMBRIGHT ST

*

*

*

*

*

*

4

4

1

503 E POCAHONTAS AVE

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

5606 N BRANCH AVE

*

*

*

*

*

3

4

2

*

108 E NORTH ST

*

*

*

*

1

1

1

*

*

504 FRIERSON

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

1

5503 N SEMINOLE AVE

*

*

*

*

2

*

*

*

*

304 E NORTH ST

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

3

4

9

6

2

TOTAL
Carrollwood
Refinance

1965-1969 1970-1974 1975-1979 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2010
3321 PICWOOD RD

*

*

*

1

2

*

*

*

*

11517 ARECA RD

1

*

1

1

*

*

1

2

*

11735 LIPSEY RD

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

12007 LAKE RIDGE RD

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

1

3024 SAMARA DR

*

*

*

1

1

*

*

*

*

3008 PEACOCK LN

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

11809 LIPSEY RD

*

*

*

*

1

1

*

1

*

10517 CARROLLVIEW DR

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

2

3320 VALENCIA RD

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

10908 JUNIPERUS PL

*

*

*

*

*

1

1

2

*

3109 BELMORE RD

*

*

*

*

*

2

*

*

*

10107 LINDELAAN DR

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

11718 PLUMOSA RD

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

1

3315 KORINA LN

*

*

2

1

*

*

*

*

*

10606 COQUITA LN

*

*

*

*

2

3

1

2

3324 VALENCIA RD

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

3

3

4

6

7

3

7

7

TOTAL

1

Refinance

TOTAL

1965-1969 1970-1974 1975-1979 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2010
10317 MEADOW CROSSING DR

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

1

10338 GOLDENBROOK WAY

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

2

10226 GRANT CREEK DR

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

10326 BENEVA DR

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

1

*

10414 WILLARK WAY

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

2

2249 GUILFORD LN

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

2

10336 MEADOW CROSSING DR

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

10912 ANCIENT FUTURES DR

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

1

3

18216 BROOKPARK DR

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

1

3

10340 BIRDWATCH DR

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

18421 MEADOW BLOSSOM LN

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

3

13
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Appendix B (continued)
Table B7 Case studies of properties from each sample: Foreclosure dates. (Hillsborough
County, 2010)
Foreclosure
Seminole Heights

1965-1969 1970-1974 1975-1979 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2010
307 E LAMBRIGHT ST

*

*

*

*

*

*

1

*

*

503 E POCAHONTAS AVE

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

5606 N BRANCH AVE

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

108 E NORTH ST

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

504 FRIERSON

*

*

*

1

*

*

*

*

5503 N SEMINOLE AVE

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

304 E NORTH ST

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

TOTAL

1

Foreclosure

1

1965-1969 1970-1974 1975-1979 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2010

Carrollwood
3321 PICWOOD RD

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

11517 ARECA RD

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

11735 LIPSEY RD

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

12007 LAKE RIDGE RD

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

3024 SAMARA DR

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

3008 PEACOCK LN

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

11809 LIPSEY RD

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

10517 CARROLLVIEW DR

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

1

3320 VALENCIA RD

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

10908 JUNIPERUS PL

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

3109 BELMORE RD

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

10107 LINDELAAN DR

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

11718 PLUMOSA RD

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

10606 COQUITA LN

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

3324 VALENCIA RD

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

TOTAL

1

Foreclosure

1965-1969 1970-1974 1975-1979 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2010
10317 MEADOW CROSSING DR

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

10338 GOLDENBROOK WAY

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

10326 BENEVA DR

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

2

10414 WILLARK WAY

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

2249 GUILFORD LN

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

10336 MEADOW CROSSING DR

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

10912 ANCIENT FUTURES DR

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

18216 BROOKPARK DR

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

10340 BIRDWATCH DR

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

1

1

18421 MEADOW BLOSSOM LN

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

1

3
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Appendix C
Interview Journal
IRB #6930
1/23/2012 – Seminole Height Community Garden seed exchange. Growers involved in
the Seminole Heights Community Garden and various Seminole Heights social gardening
clubs were asked about the neighborhood and why community gardening was
successful.
1/30/2012 – Interview with R.H. and M.H., first time homebuyers in the Seminole
Heights neighborhood. They are concerned with the small size of their home but enjoy
the cultural and commercial opportunities in the area.
2/1/2012 – Email interview with lifelong Seminole Heights resident D. H. who celebrates
the rejuvenation of local commercial areas and the growing number of young families in
the neighborhood.
2/2/2012 – Interviewed S. C.. Subject worked in the home lending industry for 25 years
and worked for banks, correspondent lenders and builders.
2/7/2012 – Phone interview with M. D., homeowner in Cross Creek area. M.D. worries
about the growing population of renters and transient families drawn to the multi-family
housing and is concerned with security.
2/10/2012 – Interview with M. S., President of the Carrollwood Civic Association.
Discussed the history of Carrollwood and the reasons he feels the neighborhood not only
retains residents for so long but attract ‘legacy’ residents in the form of children and
grandchildren of homeowners that buy homes in the area.

86

Appendix D
Permissions
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Appendix D (continued)
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